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Abstract
In property rights theory, firm is an organizational response to reduce trans-
action cost associated with hold-up of using market mechanism. We claim that
strategic alliance – without changing firm boundaries or asset ownership – is
another type of organizational response. We construct a model to investigate
individual firms’ strategic choice on specialization or diversification when pro-
ducing intermediate products and their further choice of organizational form:
autarchy or forming strategic alliance. We introduce fixed learning costs as an
indicator of scales of economy and show that only if fixed learning costs are
large enough, will firms have incentive to be specialization and form strategic
alliance. We distinguish between asymmetric strategic alliance and symmetric
strategic alliance and show that transaction cost is not monotonic with respect
to fixed learning costs. In particular, for asymmetric strategic alliance, there
exists overinvestment with un-utilized capacity. Further, asymmetric strategic
alliance is always unstable, while symmetric strategic alliance is stable only if
fixed learning costs are large enough. The firm who is entitled with higher
learning cost gets higher payoff – rewards for the endeavor. If firms are more
patient, they are less likely to form strategic alliance.
JEL classification: D23, L14, L22
Keywords: Endogenous Transaction Cost, Hold-up, Specialization, Overin-
vestment, Strategic Alliance
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1 Introduction
“Hold-up arises when part of the return on an agents relationship-specific investments
is ex post expropriable by his trading partner.”(Che and Sa´kovics 2007) This leads
to underinvestment ex ante. As an organizational response, the inefficiency and the
corresponding transaction cost1 could be reduced through vertical integration (Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian 1978, and Williamson 1979). This was formally incorporated
into property rights theory (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990), in
which the owner of the firm is entitled residual rights of control to minimize the
distortion of hold-up.
In contrast, we focus on another type of organizational form – strategic alliance,
“where non-integrated parties coordinate activities without changing firm boundaries
or asset ownership” (Baker and Gibbons 2002). A notable example is the shoe and
garment industry in Wenzhou, Zhejiang, China. Firms specialize on the productions
of some intermediate parts, exchange with others, and assemble them into brands of
their own.2 To be specialization, firms enjoy the benefit of scales of economy. To
be diversification, firms avoid the possible hold-up afterward. Due to this trade-off,
transaction cost is endogenized. We claim that strategic alliance – without changing
firm boundaries or asset ownership – is another type of organizational response to
reduce the transaction cost associated with hold-up.
In this paper, we construct a model to investigate individual firms’ strategic choice
on specialization or diversification when producing intermediate products and their
further choice of organizational form: autarchy or forming strategic alliance. In our
model, we introduce fixed learning costs in production of intermediate products as
an indicator of scales of economy. The larger fixed learning costs are, the larger the
benefit from specialization and forming strategic alliance are.
The discrepancy between our model and current property rights theory is that in
our model firms could form strategic alliance to take advantage of the specialization
and the associated scales of economy meanwhile keeping independence of each firm,
while in property rights theory firms may integrate to entitle residual rights of control
to the owner to reduce the transaction cost. Further, in property rights theory, firms
could negotiate for the optimal ownership structure ex ante. In contrast, in our
model, firms can not reach a contractible arrangement regarding specialization or
diversification ex ante. They have to rely on self-enforceable agreement, i.e. Nash
equilibrium.
Our main results are summarized below.
1. Only if fixed learning costs are large enough, will firms have incentive to be
1Coase (1937) suggested firm is the organizational form to reduce transaction cost of using market
mechanism.
2See the online report: http://www.efu.com.cn/data/2008/2008-01-29/227157.shtml.
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specialization and form strategic alliance.
2. If fixed learning costs are in some middle range, one firm may diversify while
the other specializes on the intermediate product with lower learning cost and
they form asymmetric strategic alliance. If fixed learning costs are large,
both firms will be specialization and form symmetric strategic alliance.
3. We define transaction cost as the difference between firms’ total payoff at
the first best and that at the equilibrium choice. We show that transaction cost
is not monotonic with respect to fixed learning costs.
4. For the asymmetric strategic alliance, the firm diversified merely increases
its bargaining power through diversification during the negotiation afterward.
There exists overinvestment with un-utilized capacity since the firm di-
versified still specializes on producing the intermediate product with higher
learning cost according to the equilibrium agreement of the negotiation. In
contrast, if firms are diversification and autarchy, we also have overinvestment
but with fully utilized capacity.
5. The firm who is entitled with higher learning cost gets higher payoff – “rewards
for the endeavor”. Intuitively, in the asymmetric strategic alliance, the firm
diversified gets higher bargaining power through diversification and therefore
gets higher payoff.
6. The asymmetric strategic alliance is always unstable, while the symmetric
strategic alliance is unstable if fixed learning costs are small and stable if fixed
learning costs are large. Here, unstable means that if the game continues to
another stage the strategic alliance will be disbanded to autarchy.3
7. If firms are more patient, they are less likely to form strategic alliance since the
benefit from diversification is higher by avoiding the possible hold-up both in
the current period and in the future periods.
Our model is related to the literature on specialization and division of labor. Yang
and Borland (1991) provide a microeconomic mechanism to explain the evolution of
specialization. Their model begins with the consumer-producer role for each indi-
vidual. They point out the monopoly power accruing to producers due to the entry
barriers created by learning by doing and increasing returns. However, they nullify
the monopoly power by the assumption of the option contract in the future market,
which exempts presumptively the possibility for negotiation. Hence, they turn to a
Walrasian regime to describe the equilibrium of the division of labor. In our model,
3This supports the argument of Wang (2005) that most coalitions don’t last long. Only if the
stakes are high enough, will coalitions be sustainable.
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we identify the key role of bargaining power created by fixed learning costs, and pro-
vide the possibility for negotiation, which thus enriches the story of the evolution of
specialization through a Nash equilibrium scheme. Becker and Murphy (1992) argue
that coordination costs and the amount and extent of knowledge are key factors in
determining the degree of specialization, which sharply contrast with the traditional
view emphasizing the limitations of specialization imposed by the thickness of the
market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the setup of
our basic model and presents our main results. Section 3 considers the case if the
game continues to an unexpected second stage – myopic case. Section 4 considers the
case if the game continues to an expected second stage – foresighted case. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Basic Model
There are two firms M1 and M2. They need intermediate products x and y to
produce their own final goods. Each firm may produce x and y by itself (the case of
autarchy) or specialize and produce only one and exchange with the other firm (the
case of forming strategic alliance). For simplicity, we assume each firm has one unit
of labor endowment in the production of x and y. To produce x and y, each firm
has to incur some fixed learning cost ax and ay. That is, to be capable to produce
x, one has to spend ax unit of labor in advance; to be capable to produce y, one has
to spend ay unit of labor in advance. Further, we assume
1
2
> ax > ay > 0. If one
invests both ax and ay , this is the diversification case, denoted as D. We assume
that if M1 does not diversify, he can only choose to specialize on x, denoted as Sx.
If M2 does not diversify, he can only choose to specialize on y, denoted as Sy.
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If one chooses D, the production function for x and y is x + y = 1 − ax − ay. If
M1 chooses Sx, the production function for x is x = 1 − ax. If M2 chooses Sy, the
production function for y is y = 1 − ay. In addition, suppose M1 and M2 have the
same production function for final products, f(x, y) = x
1
2y
1
2 .
At date 1.0, M1 and M2 learn to produce x, y, or both: specialization of diversi-
fication. At date 1.1, they negotiate to form strategic alliance. If negotiation breaks
down, they will be autarchy. If they agree to form strategic alliance, we assume they
will divide the trade surplus based on Nash Bargaining solution, in which the bar-
gaining weight of each firm is equalized to be 1/2. At date 1.2, x and y are produced
and exchanged according to the agreement at date 1.1 if there is any. The timing of
the model is illustrated in Figure 1.
Denote the choices of M1 and M2 at date 1.0 as (C1, C2), where C1 ∈ {Sx, D}
4This will simplify our analysis and avoid the possible coordination failure from M1 and M2.
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Figure 1: Timing
and C2 ∈ {Sy, D}. To the point view of social planner, clearly the first best solution
is (Sx, Sy). That is, M1 specializes on x andM2 specializes on y. Now we turn to the
question: what are the equilibrium choices of M1 and M2 at date 1.0? The following
lemma solves the payoffs at date 1.0 for all possible combinations of (C1, C2).
Lemma 1 The payoff matrix at date 1.0 is as described in table 1, where UA =
1
2
√
(1− ax − ay)2, UXD = 12
√
(1− ax)(1− ax − ay), UDY = 12
√
(1− ax − ay)(1− ay),
UXY =
1
2
√
(1− ax)(1− ay).
Table 1: Payoff matrix
M2
Sy D
M1
Sx UXY , UXY UXD − 12UA, UXD + 12UA
D UDY +
1
2
UA, UDY − 12UA UA, UA
Proof. See the Appendix.
The following proposition shows that if the fixed learning cost ax and ay are
small, the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 will be (D,D) and M1 and M2 end up with
autarchy. If ax and ay are large, the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 will be (Sx, Sy)
andM1 andM2 end up with forming symmetric strategic alliance, in whichM1
and M2 have the symmetric bargaining position and get the same payoff. If ax and
ay are in some middle range, the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 may be (D,Sy) and
M1 and M2 end up with forming asymmetric strategic alliance, in which M1
and M2 have the asymmetric bargaining position and get different payoff. Finally,
(Sx, D) will never be an equilibrium and there may exist multiple equilibria.
Proposition 1 i) If the fixed learning cost ax and ay are small, M1 and M2 end up
with (D,D) at date 1.0.
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ii) If ax and ay are large, M1 and M2 end up with (Sx, Sy) at date 1.0.
iii) If ax and ay are in some middle range, M1 and M2 may end up with (D,Sy).
iv) (Sx, D) will never be an equilibrium.
v) There may exist multiple equilibria.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition is that if learning costs are small, it is worth diversifying to avoid
the possible hold-up during the negotiation afterward. If learning costs are large,
it is better to specialize and form symmetric strategic alliance, in which the first
best is achieved. If learning costs are in some middle range, one may have incentive
to diversify while the other specializes on the one intermediate product with low
learning cost. In this case, they form asymmetric strategic alliance.5 (See figure 2 for
the MATLAB simulation.)
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Figure 2: Nash Equilibrium
5By our assumption, not matter what, M1 has to spend ax to learn to produce x, while M2 has
to spend ay to learn to produce y. Since ax > ay, M1 has higher incentive to spend ay and diversify
than M2 to spend ax and diversify. That is to say, if (Sx, D) is an equilibrium, then for sure (D,Sy)
will be an equilibrium.
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Define transaction cost as the difference between the total payoff for M1 and
M2 at the first best and the total payoff for M1 and M2 at the equilibrium choice.
The following corollary says that transaction cost is not monotonic with respect to
fixed learning costs. (See figure 3 for the MATLAB simulation.)
Corollary 1 (Transaction Cost)
i) If ax and ay are small, transaction cost increases in ax and ay.
ii) If ax and ay are increasing to some extent, there may exist a jump down of the
transaction cost. After that, it increases in ax and ay again.
iii) If ax and ay are large enough, transaction cost jumps down to zero.
Figure 3: Transaction Cost
Intuitively, if fixed learning costs are small, the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 will
be (D,D) and M1 and M2 end up with autarchy. In this case, transaction cost is
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2UXY − 2UA, which is increasing in fixed learning costs. If fixed learning costs are
increasing to some extent, the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 may be (D,Sy) and M1
and M2 end up with forming asymmetric strategic alliance. In this case, transaction
cost is 2UXY − 2UDY , which is increasing in fixed learning costs. Since UA < UDY ,
there exists a jump down of transaction cost during the transition from (D,D) to
(D,Sy). If fixed learning costs are large enough, the equilibrium choice at date 1.0
will be (Sx, Sy) and M1 and M2 end up with forming symmetric strategic alliance,
which is the first best. Consequently, transaction cost jumps down to zero.
The following corollary says that if the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 is (D,Sy) and
M1 and M2 form asymmetric strategic alliance, there exists the case of un-utilized
capacity, in whichM1 spends ay learns to produce y, but still specializes on producing
x during the production afterwards. The diversification of M1 merely serves as the
purpose of increasing its bargaining power during the negotiation of forming strategic
alliance.
Corollary 2 (overinvestment with un-utilized capacity)
If at date 1.0 the equilibrium choice is (D,Sy), then at date 1.2 the equilibrium
result is M1 specializes on producing x and M2 specializes on producing y.
From the proof of proposition 1 part (iii), we have the above corollary. In this
case, there exists overinvestment with un-utilized capacity. In contrast, if M1 and
M2 end up with (D,D) at date 1.0 and being autarchy, we also have overinvestment
but with fully utilized capacity.
The following corollary says thatM1’s payoff will always be higher than or at least
equal to M2’s payoff. That is to say, the firm who is entitled with higher learning
cost gets higher payoff – “rewards for the endeavor”.
Corollary 3 (Rewards for the Endeavor)
At any equilibrium, M1’s payoff will always be higher than or at least equal to
M2’s payoff.
Intuitively, if at date 1.0 the equilibrium choice is (D,Sy) andM1 andM2 end up
with forming asymmetric strategic alliance, M1 diversifies and gets higher bargaining
power and therefore gets higher payoff. If at date 1.0 the equilibrium choice is (D,D)
or (Sx, Sy), M1 and M2 get the same payoff from autarchy or symmetric strategic
alliance. Moreover, from proposition 1, (Sx, D) will never be an equilibrium choice
at date 1.0. Thus, we have the corollary above.
Intuitively, to let (Sx, D) be an equilibrium at date 1.0, UXD has to be large
enough. From the proof of proposition 1 part (iv), we must have{
UXD ≥ 32UA
UXD ≥ UXY − 12UA
8
But according to our setting, if ax and ay are large enough such that first inequality
holds, then UXY will be too large such that the second inequality will not hold. If ax
and ay are small enough such that second inequality holds, then UA will be too large
such that the first inequality will not hold.
3 Two-stage Model: Myopic Case
Now consider the case if the game continues to a second stage. In this section, suppose
the second stage is unexpected at the beginning of the game. That is equivalent to
sayM1 andM2 are myopic at the first stage. In this case, the fist stage game is same
as the basic model in section 2. The question is: if M1 and M2 are forming strategic
alliance at stage 1, do they have incentive to change to diversification and autarchy
at the second stage? In other words, is the strategic alliance at stage 1 stable?
Obviously, if the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 is (D,D), the payoffs at date 2.0
for M1 and M2 are (1
2
, 1
2
). The following lemma solves the payoffs at date 2.0 given
the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 is (D,Sy), (Sx, Sy), and (Sx, D) respectively.
Lemma 2 If the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 is (D,Sy), (Sx, Sy), and (Sx, D) re-
spectively, the payoff matrix at date 2.0 is as described in table 2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The following proposition shows that if learning costs are high, M1 and M2 may
stick with specialization and the strategic alliance survives. Otherwise, they will
change to diversification and the strategic alliance will be disbanded to autarchy at
stage 2.
Proposition 2 i) If the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 is (D,Sy) and M1 and M2
form asymmetric strategic alliance, then at the second stage M2 will change
to diversification and M1 and M2 end up with autarchy. That is to say, the
asymmetric strategic alliance at stage 1 is always unstable.
ii) If the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 is (Sx, Sy) and M1 and M2 form symmetric
strategic alliance, then at the second stage M1 and M2 will change to diversifi-
cation and end up with autarchy if ay < 2
√
3 − 3; they may stick with (Sx, Sy)
and the symmetric strategic alliance at stage 1 survives otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition is that only if learning costs are large enough, willM1 andM2 have
incentive to stick with specialization and the strategic alliance survives. Since at the
beginning of the first stage M1 and M2 have incurred at least some learning cost,
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Table 2: Payoff matrix at date 2.0
i) given (D,Sy) at date 1.0
M2
Sy D
M1 D 3
4
, 1
4
1
2
, 1−ax
2
ii) given (Sx, Sy) at date 1.0
M2
Sy D
M1
Sx
1
2
, 1
2
√
1−ax
2
− 1−ax
4
,
√
1−ax
2
+ 1−ax
4
D
√
1−ay
2
+ 1−ay
4
,
√
1−ay
2
− 1−ay
4
1−ay
2
, 1−ax
2
iii) given (Sx, D) at date 1.0
M2
D
M1
Sx
1
4
, 3
4
D 1−ay
2
, 1
2
at date 2.0 the cost of becoming diversification is low. Thus, at the second stage,
M1 and M2 have higher incentive to diversify to avoid the possible hold-up during
the negotiation afterward. Moreover, if the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 is (Sx, Sy)
and learning costs are large enough such that (Sx, Sy) is still a Nash equilibrium at
date 2.0, (D,D) is also a Nash equilibrium at date 2.0, even though (D,D) is Pareto
dominated by (Sx, Sy). In this case, we have a coordination game. In contrast, if the
equilibrium choice at at date 1.0 is (D,Sy), according to proposition 1 this implies
learning costs are not large enough. Then for sureM2 will change to diversification at
date 2.0 andM1 andM2 end up with autarchy and the asymmetric strategic alliance
formed at stage 1 is always unstable. (See figure 4 for the MATLAB simulation.)
Similar to the one stage static case in section 2, we have the corollary for “non-
monotonic transaction cost” and “rewards for the endeavor” at the second stage as
follows. But we don’t have the corollary for “un-utilized capacity” since at date
2.0 M1 and M2 will either stick with the symmetric strategic alliance or change to
diversification and end up with autarchy.
Corollary 4 (Transaction Cost – Myopic Case)
i) If ax and ay are small, transaction cost is zero.
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Figure 4: Nash Equilibrium at the Second Stage – Myopic Case
ii) If ax and ay are increasing to some extent, there may exist a jump up of transaction
cost. After that, it increases in ax and ay again.
iii) If ax and ay are large enough but still ay < 2
√
3 − 3, there exists a jump up of
transaction cost and it increases in ax and ay again after the jump.
iv) If ay ≥ 2
√
3− 3, transaction cost jumps down to zero.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 5 (Rewards for the Endeavor – Myopic Case)
At any equilibrium, M1’s payoff will always be higher than or at least equal to
M2’s payoff.
From lemma 2 and proposition 2, clearly at any equilibrium, M1’s payoff will
always be higher than or at least equal to M2’s payoff.
4 Two-stage Model: Foresighted Case
In this section, consider the case if the game continues to a second stage and the
second stage is expected at the beginning of the game. That is equivalent to say
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M1 and M2 are foresighted at the first stage. In this case, we need to use backward
induction, starting from the second stage.
Suppose M1 and M2 have the common discount factor is δ. Combining lemma 1
and lemma 2, table 3 solves the discounted two-stage payoffs at date 1.0.6
Table 3: Discounted two-stage payoff matrix
i) if ay < 2
√
3− 3
M2
Sy D
M1
Sx UXY + δ
1−ay
2
, UXY + δ
1−ax
2
UXD − 12UA + δ 1−ay2 , UXD + 12UA + δ 12
D UDY +
1
2
UA + δ
1
2
, UDY − 12UA + δ 1−ax2 UA + δ 12 , UA + δ 12
ii) if ay ≥ 2
√
3− 3
M2
Sy D
M1
Sx UXY + δ
1
2
, UXY + δ
1
2
UXD − 12UA + δ 1−ay2 , UXD + 12UA + δ 12
D UDY +
1
2
UA + δ
1
2
, UDY − 12UA + δ 1−ax2 UA + δ 12 , UA + δ 12
The following proposition shows that, if the fixed learning cost ax and ay are
small, M1 and M2 end up with (D,D) at date 1.0 and stick with (D,D) at date 2.0,
denoted as (D,D;D,D), where the first pair is the choice at date 1.0 and the second
pair is the choice at date 2.0. If ax and ay are large, M1 and M2 may end up with
(Sx, Sy;Sx, Sy). If ax and ay are in some middle range, M1 and M2 may end up with
(D,Sy;D,D). M1 and M2 are more likely to end up with (D,D;D,D) if M1 and
M2 are more patient.
Proposition 3 i) If the fixed learning cost ax and ay are small, M1 and M2 end up
with (D,D;D,D).
ii) If ax > ay ≥ 2
√
3 − 3, M1 and M2 may end up with (Sx, Sy;Sx, Sy). And the
symmetric strategic alliance at stage 1 survives.
iii) If ax and ay are in some middle range,M1 andM2 may end up with (D,Sy;D,D)
or (Sx, Sy;Sx, Sy). And the strategic alliance at stage 1, either symmetric or
asymmetric, is unstable.
6For simplicity, we assume if there are multiple equilibria, M1 and M2 will end up with the
Poreto dominant one.
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iv) As δ increases, M1 and M2 are more likely to end up with (D,D;D,D).
v) There may exist multiple equilibria.
vi) (Sx, D) will never be an equilibrium choice at date 1.0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition is that if learning costs are large enough such that (Sx, Sy;Sx, Sy)
is a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium, (D,D;D,D) is also a Subgame Perfect Nash
equilibrium, even though (D,D;D,D) is Pareto dominated by (Sx, Sy;Sx, Sy). In
this case, we have a coordination game. If M1 and M2 are more patient, they are
less likely to form strategic alliance since the benefit from diversification is higher by
avoiding the possible hold-up both in the current period and in the future period.
The exception is that if learning costs are large enough (ax > ay ≥ 2
√
3 − 3), the
symmetric strategic alliance is sustainable. (See figure 5 and 6 for the MATLAB
simulation for δ = 0.1 and δ = 0.5 respectively.)
Figure 5: Nash Equilibrium at date 1.0 – foresighted Case: δ = 0.1
Similar to the one stage static case in section 2, we have the corollary for “non-
monotonic transaction cost”, “overinvestment – un-utilized capacity”, and “rewards
for the endeavor” as follows.
Corollary 6 (Transaction Cost – foresighted Case)
13
Figure 6: Nash Equilibrium at date 1.0 – foresighted Case: δ = 0.5
i) If ay ≥ 2
√
3− 3, transaction cost is zero.
ii) If ay < 2
√
3− 3, Given δ transaction cost is not monotonic with respect to ax and
ay; given ax and ay, transaction cost is non-decreasing with respect to δ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 7 (overinvestment with un-utilized capacity – foresighted Case)
If at date 1.0 M1 and M2 end up with (D,Sy), then at date 1.2 the equilibrium
result is M1 specializes on producing x and M2 specializes on producing y.
From the proof of proposition 3, if at date 1.0 M1 and M2 end up with (D,Sy),
then they form asymmetric strategic alliance, in which M1 specializes on producing
x and M2 specializes on producing y at date 1.2. But this asymmetric strategic
alliance is unstable. It will be disbanded to autarchy at stage 2 and consequently,
overinvestment with un-utilized capacity disappears.
Corollary 8 (Rewards for the Endeavor – foresighted Case)
At any equilibrium, M1’s payoff will always be higher than or at least equal to
M2’s payoff.
14
From lemma ?? and proposition 3, clearly at any equilibrium, M1’s payoff will
always be higher than or at least equal to M2’s payoff.
5 Conclusion
In property rights theory, firm is an organizational response to reduce transaction
cost associated with hold-up of using market mechanism. We claim that strategic
alliance – without changing firm boundaries or asset ownership – is another type of
organizational response. We construct a model to investigate individual firms’ strate-
gic choice on specialization or diversification when producing intermediate products
and their further choice of organizational form: autarchy or forming strategic alliance.
To be specialization, firms enjoy the benefit of scales of economy. To be diversifica-
tion, firms avoid the possible hold-up afterward. Due to this trade-off, transaction
cost is endogenized. We introduce fixed learning costs as an indicator of scales of
economy. We show that only if fixed learning costs are large enough, will firms have
incentive to be specialization and form strategic alliance. We distinguish between
asymmetric strategic alliance and symmetric strategic alliance and show that trans-
action cost is not monotonic with respect to fixed learning costs. In particular, for
asymmetric strategic alliance, there exists overinvestment with un-utilized capacity
and the firm diversified merely increases its bargaining power through diversification
during the negotiation afterward. Further, asymmetric strategic alliance is always
unstable, while symmetric strategic alliance is stable only if fixed learning costs are
large enough. The firm who is entitled with higher learning cost gets higher payoff
– rewards for the endeavor. If firms are more patient, they are less likely to form
strategic alliance.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
By backward induction, if (C1, C2) = (Sx, Sy), at date 1.1 whenM1 andM2 negotiate
to form strategic alliance, the outside option forM1 andM2 is zero. Since we assume
ifM1 andM2 form strategic alliance, they will divide the trade surplus through Nash
Bargaining solution and the bargaining weight of each firm is equalized to be 1/2, we
need to solve the following maximization problem.
max
x1,x2,y1,y2
[U1(Sx, Sy)− 0][U2(Sx, Sy)− 0] = √x1y1√x2y2
s.t. x1 + x2 = 1− ax
y1 + y2 = 1− ay
15
The solution is x1 = x2 =
1−ax
2
and y1 = y2 =
1−ay
2
. Thus, U1(Sx, Sy) = U2(Sx, Sy) =
UXY , where UXY =
1
2
√
(1− ax)(1− ay).
If (C1, C2) = (D,D), at date 1.1 when M1 and M2 negotiate to form strategic
alliance, the outside option forM1 andM2 is autarchy. The payoff from autarchy for
each firm, denoted as UA, is equal to
1
2
√
(1− ax − ay)2. Similarly, solve the following
maximization problem.
max
x1,x2,y1,y2,x
p
1,x
p
2
[U1(D,D)− UA][U2(D,D)− UA] = (√x1y1 − UA)(√x2y2 − UA)
s.t. x1 + x2 = x
p
1 + x
p
2
y1 + y2 = 2(1− ax − ay)− xp1 − xp2
where xp1 and x
p
2 are the amount of x produced byM1 andM2 respectively. The solu-
tion is x1 = x2 = y1 = y2 =
1−ax−ay
2
. Thus, U1(D,D) = U2(D,D) =
1
2
√
(1− ax − ay)2 =
UA.
If (C1, C2) = (Sx, D), at date 1.1 when M1 and M2 negotiate to form strategic
alliance, the outside option for M1 is zero and the outside option for M2 is UA.
Similarly, solve the following maximization problem.
max
x1,x2,y1,y2,x
p
2
[U1(Sx, D)− 0][U2(Sx, D)− UA] = (√x1y1)(√x2y2 − UA)
s.t. x1 + x2 = 1− ax + xp2
y1 + y2 = 1− ax − ay − xp2
where xp2 is the amount of x produced byM2. The solution is x1 =
√
1−ax
2
√
(1−ax)(1−ax−ay)−UA√
1−ax−ay
,
y1 =
√
1−ax−ay
2
√
(1−ax)(1−ax−ay)−UA√
1−ax , x2 = 1 − ax −
√
1−ax
2
√
(1−ax)(1−ax−ay)−UA√
1−ax−ay
, and
y2 = 1− ax − ay −
√
1−ax−ay
2
√
(1−ax)(1−ax−ay)−UA√
1−ax . Thus, U1(Sx, D) = UXD − 12UA and
U2(Sx, D) = UXD +
1
2
UA, where UXD =
1
2
√
(1− ax)(1− ax − ay).
If (C1, C2) = (D,Sy), at date 1.1 when M1 and M2 negotiate to form strategic
alliance, the outside option for M1 is UA and the outside option for M2 is zero.
Similarly, solve the following maximization problem.
max
x1,x2,y1,y2,y
p
1
[U1(D,Sy)− UA][U2(D,Sy)− 0] = (√x1y1 − UA)(√x2y2)
s.t. x1 + x2 = 1− ax − ay − yp1
y1 + y2 = 1− ay + yp1
where yp1 is the amount of y produced byM1. The solution is x1 =
√
1−ax−ay
2
√
(1−ax−ay)(1−ay)+UA√
1−ay
,
y1 =
√
1−ay
2
√
(1−ax−ay)(1−ay)+UA√
1−ax−ay
, x2 = 1 − ax − ay −
√
1−ax−ay
2
√
(1−ax−ay)(1−ay)+UA√
1−ay
,
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and y2 = 1 − ay −
√
1−ay
2
√
(1−ax−ay)(1−ay)+UA√
1−ax−ay
. Thus, U1(D,Sy) = UDY +
1
2
UA and
U2(D,Sy) = UDY − 12UA, where UDY = 12
√
(1− ax − ay)(1− ay).
Proof of Proposition 1
i) If ax → 0 and ay → 0, then the payoff matrix in lemma 1 will converge to table
4.
Table 4: Payoff matrix: ax → 0 and ay → 0
M2
Sy D
M1
Sx
1
2
, 1
2
1
4
, 3
4
D 3
4
, 1
4
1
2
, 1
2
D will be the dominant strategy for both M1 and M2. And the unique Nash
Equilibrium is (D,D) at date 1.0.
ii) If ax → 12 and ay → 12 , then the payoff matrix in lemma 1 will converge to
table 5.
Table 5: Payoff matrix: ax → 12 and ay → 12
M2
Sy D
M1
Sx
1
4
, 1
4
0, 0
D 0, 0 0, 0
Also, if ax → 12 and ay → 12 , we have UXD − 12UA > UA and UDY − 12UA > UA.
Thus, Sx will be the dominant strategy for M1 and Sy will be the dominant strategy
for M2. The unique Nash Equilibrium is (Sx, Sy) at date 1.0.
iii) For instance, if ax = 0.47 and ay = 0.2, we have
3
2
UA < UDY and UXY − 12UA <
UDY . Then (D,Sy) is a Nash Equilibrium.
iv) To let (Sx, D) be a Nash Equilibrium, we must have{
UXD − 12UA ≥ UA
UXD +
1
2
UA ≥ UXY
The first inequality implies
√
(1− ax) ≥ 32
√
(1− ax − ay). Rearrange the second
inequality and we have 1
2
(1 − ax − ay) ≥
√
(1− ax)[
√
(1− ay) −
√
(1− ax − ay)] ≥
17
3
2
√
(1− ax − ay)[
√
(1− ay)−
√
(1− ax − ay)]. This implies
√
(1− ax − ay) ≥ 34
√
(1− ay).
That is to say,
√
(1− ax) ≥ 32
√
(1− ax − ay) ≥ 98
√
(1− ay) >
√
(1− ay). Since
ax > ay, this is a contradiction.
v) For instance, if ax = 0.36 and ay = 0.3, we can check that both (D,D) and
(Sy, Sy) are Nash Equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2
i) If the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 is (D,Sy), M1 has learned to produce
both x and y and M2 has learned to produce y at the first stage. The question is
whether M2 will stick with Sy or learn to produce x and become diversification at
date 2.0.
Similar to the proof of lemma 1, if M2 sticks with Sy, at date 2.1 when M1 and
M2 negotiate to form strategic alliance, the outside option for M1 is autarchy and
the outside option for M2 is zero. The payoff from autarchy for M1 conditional on
diversification at the first stage, denoted as UA|D, is equal to 12 . We need to solve the
following maximization problem.
max
x1,x2,y1,y2,y
p
1
[U1(D,Sy|D,Sy)− UA|D][U2(D,Sy|D,Sy)− 0] = (√x1y1 − 1
2
)(
√
x2y2)
s.t. x1 + x2 = 1− yp1
y1 + y2 = 1 + y
p
1
where yp1 is the amount of y produced byM1 at date 2.2. The solution is x1 = y1 =
3
4
,
x2 = y2 =
1
4
. Thus, U1(D,Sy|D,Sy) = 34 and U2(D,Sy|D,Sy) = 14 .
If M2 learns to produce x and becomes diversification at date 2.0, when M1 and
M2 negotiate to form strategic alliance at date 2.1, the outside option forM1 andM2
are both autarchy. The payoff from autarchy for M1 conditional on diversification
at the first stage is UA|D, which is equal to 12 . The payoff from autarchy for M2
conditional on specialization on y at the first stage, denoted as UA|Sy , is equal to
1−ax
2
. Similarly, solve the following maximization problem.
max
x1,x2,y1,y2,x
p
1,x
p
2
[U1(D,D|D,Sy)− UA|D][U2(D,D|D,Sy)− UA|Sy ] = (
√
x1y1 − 12)(
√
x2y2 − 1− ax2 )
s.t. x1 + x2 = x
p
1 + x
p
2
y1 + y2 = (2− ax)− xp1 − xp2
where xp1 and x
p
2 are the amount of x produced byM1 andM2 at date 2.2 respectively.
The solution is x1 = y1 =
1
2
, x2 = y2 =
1−ax
2
. Thus, U1(D,D|D,Sy) = 12 = UA|D and
U2(D,D|D,Sy) = 1−ax2 = UA|Sy .
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ii) If the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 is (Sx, Sy), M1 has learned to produce
x and M2 has learned to produce y at the first stage. The question is whether M1
and/or M2 will stick with specialization or become diversification at date 2.0.
If M1 and M2 both stick with specialization, at date 2.1 when M1 and M2
negotiate to form strategic alliance, the outside option for M1 and M2 are zero.
Similarly, solve the following maximization problem.
max
x1,x2,y1,y2
[U1(Sx, Sy|Sx, Sy)− 0][U2(Sx, Sy|Sx, Sy)− 0] = (√x1y1)(√x2y2)
s.t. x1 + x2 = 1
y1 + y2 = 1
The solution is x1 = y1 = x2 = y2 =
1
2
. Thus, U1(Sx, Sy|Sx, Sy) = U2(Sx, Sy|Sx, Sy) =
1
2
.
IfM1 sticks with specialization andM2 becomes diversification, at date 2.1 when
M1 andM2 negotiate to form strategic alliance, the outside option forM1 is zero and
the outside option for M2 is autarchy. The payoff from autarchy for M2 conditional
on specialization on y at the first stage is UA|Sy , which is equal to
1−ax
2
. Similarly,
solve the following maximization problem.
max
x1,x2,y1,y2,x
p
2
[U1(Sx, D|Sx, Sy)− 0][U2(Sx, D|Sx, Sy)− UA|Sy ] = (
√
x1y1 − 0)(√x2y2 − 1− ax2 )
s.t. x1 + x2 = 1 + x
p
2
y1 + y2 = (1− ax)− xp2
where xp2 is the amount of x produced by M2 at date 2.2. The solution is x1 =
1
2
−
√
1−ax
4
, y1 = (1− ax)(12 −
√
1−ax
4
), x2 =
1
2
+
√
1−ax
4
, y2 = (1− ax)(12 +
√
1−ax
4
). Thus,
U1(Sx, D|Sx, Sy) =
√
1−ax
2
− 1−ax
4
and U2(Sx, D|Sx, Sy) =
√
1−ax
2
+ 1−ax
4
.
IfM1 becomes diversification andM2 sticks with specialization, at date 2.1 when
M1 andM2 negotiate to form strategic alliance, the outside option forM1 is autarchy
and the outside option for M2 is zero. The payoff from autarchy for M1 conditional
on specialization on x at the first stage is UA|Sx , which is equal to
1−ay
2
. Similarly,
solve the following maximization problem.
max
x1,x2,y1,y2,y
p
1
[U1(D,Sy|Sx, Sy)− UA|Sx ][U2(D,Sy|Sx, Sy)− 0] = (
√
x1y1 − 1− ay2 )(
√
x2y2 − 0)
s.t. x1 + x2 = (1− ay)− yp1
y1 + y2 = 1 + y
p
1
where yp1 is the amount of y produced by M1 at date 2.2. The solution is x1 =
(1 − ay)(12 +
√
1−ay
4
), y1 =
1
2
+
√
1−ay
4
, x2 = (1 − ay)(12 −
√
1−ay
4
), y2 =
1
2
−
√
1−ay
4
.
Thus, U1(D,Sy|Sx, Sy) =
√
1−ay
2
+ 1−ay
4
and U2(D,Sy|Sx, Sy) =
√
1−ay
2
− 1−ay
4
.
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If bothM1 andM2 become diversification, at date 2.1 whenM1 andM2 negotiate
to form strategic alliance, the outside option forM1 andM2 are autarchy. The payoff
from autarchy for M1 conditional on specialization on x at the first stage is UA|Sx ,
which is equal to 1−ay
2
. The payoff from autarchy forM2 conditional on specialization
on y at the first stage is UA|Sy , which is equal to
1−ax
2
. Similarly, solve the following
maximization problem.
max
x1,x2,y1,y2,x
p
1,x
p
2
[U1(D,D|Sx, Sy)− UA|Sx ][U2(D,D|Sx, Sy)− UA|Sy ] = (
√
x1y1 − 1− ay2 )(
√
x2y2 − 1− ax2 )
s.t. x1 + x2 = x
p
1 + x
p
2
y1 + y2 = (2− ax − ay)− xp1 − xp2
where xp1 and x
p
2 are the amount of x produced byM1 andM2 at date 2.2 respectively.
The solution is x1 = y1 =
1−ay
2
, x2 = y2 =
1−ax
2
. Thus, U1(D,D|Sx, Sy) = 1−ay2 =
UA|Sx and U2(D,D|Sx, Sy) = 1−ax2 = UA|Sy .
iii) If the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 is (Sx, D), M1 has learned to produce
x and M2 has learned to produce both x and y at the first stage. The question is
whether M1 will stick with Sx or learn to produce y and become diversification at
date 2.0.
Similar to the proof of lemma 1, if M1 sticks with Sx, at date 2.1 when M1 and
M2 negotiate to form strategic alliance, the outside option for M1 is zero and the
outside option for M2 is autarchy. The payoff from autarchy for M2 conditional on
diversification at the first stage is UA|D, which is equal to 12 . We need to solve the
following maximization problem.
max
x1,x2,y1,y2,x
p
2
[U1(Sx, D|Sx, D)− 0][U2(Sx, D|Sx, D)− UA|D] = (√x1y1)(√x2y2 − 1
2
)
s.t. x1 + x2 = 1 + x
p
2
y1 + y2 = 1− xp2
where xp2 is the amount of x produced byM2 at date 2.2. The solution is x1 = y1 =
1
4
,
x2 = y2 =
3
4
. Thus, U1(Sx, D|Sx, D) = 14 and U2(Sx, D|Sx, D) = 34 .
If M1 learns to produce y and becomes diversification, at date 2.1 when M1 and
M2 negotiate to form strategic alliance, the outside option for M1 and M2 are both
autarchy. The payoff from autarchy for M1 conditional on specialization on x at
the first stage is UA|Sx , which is equal to
1−ay
2
. The payoff from autarchy for M2
conditional on diversification at the first stage is UA|D, which is equal to 12 . Similarly,
solve the following maximization problem.
max
x1,x2,y1,y2,x
p
1,x
p
2
[U1(D,D|Sx, D)− UA|Sx ][U2(D,D|Sx, D)− UA|D] = (
√
x1y1 − 1− ay2 )(
√
x2y2 − 12)
s.t. x1 + x2 = x
p
1 + x
p
2
y1 + y2 = (2− ay)− xp1 − xp2
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where xp1 and x
p
2 are the amount of x produced byM1 andM2 at date 2.2 respectively.
The solution is x1 = y1 =
1−ay
2
, x2 = y2 =
1
2
. Thus, U1(D,D|Sx, D) = 1−ay2 = UA|Sx
and U2(D,D|Sx, D) = 12 = UA|D.
Proof of Proposition 2
i) Clearly, since ax <
1
2
, 1−ax
2
> 1
4
. The dominant strategy for M2 at date 2.0 is
D.
ii) Since 0 < ay < ax <
1
2
,
√
1−ax
2
− 1−ax
4
< 1−ax
2
< 1−ay
2
. Further,
√
1−ay
2
− 1−ay
4
is
decreasing in ay and its supremum is
1
4
, while 1−ax
2
is decreasing in ax and its infimum
is 1
4
. That is to say
√
1−ay
2
− 1−ay
4
< 1−ax
2
. Thus, (D,D) is always a Nash equilibrium
at date 2.0.
Clearly, if ax > ay ≥ 2
√
3 − 3,
√
1−ax
2
− 1−ax
4
<
√
1−ay
2
+ 1−ay
4
≤ 1
2
. This implies
if ax > ay ≥ 2
√
3 − 3, (Sx, Sy) is a Nash equilibrium at date 2.0. Otherwise, if
ay < 2
√
3 − 3,
√
1−ay
2
+ 1−ay
4
> 1
2
and definitely M1 will become diversification. In
this case, (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium at date 2.0.
Proof of Corollary 4
Intuitively, if fixed learning costs are small,M1 andM2 will stick with (D,D). In this
case, transaction cost is zero. If fixed learning costs are increasing to some extent,M1
andM2 may switch from (D,Sy) to (D,D) at date 2.0. By the proof of lemma 2 part
(i), transaction cost is (1
2
+ 1
2
)−(1
2
+ 1−ax
2
) = ax
2
. If fixed learning costs are large enough
but still ay < 2
√
3 − 3, M1 and M2 will switch from (Sx, Sy) to (D,D) at date 2.0.
By the proof of lemma 2 part (ii), transaction cost is (1
2
+ 1
2
)− (1−ax
2
+ 1−ay
2
) = ax+ay
2
.
If ay ≥ 2
√
3 − 3, M1 and M2 will stick with (Sx, Sy) at date 2.0. In this case,
transaction cost is zero. (See figure 7 for the MATLAB simulation.)
Proof of Proposition 3
i) Similar to the proof of proposition 1, if ax → 0 and ay → 0, then the payoff
matrix in lemma 1 will converge to table 6. Clearly, D is the dominant strategy for
both M1 and M2 at date 1.0.
Since δ 1−ax
2
< δ 1−ay
2
< δ 1
2
, comparing table 1 and the top half of table 3, we find
that D will always be the dominant strategy for both M1 and M2 at date 1.0 in
the discounted two stage game if D is the dominant strategy for both M1 and M2
at date 1.0 in the static one stage game. Adding the second stage discounted payoff
only reinforces the dominance of D. In this case, the unique Nash Equilibrium is
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Figure 7: Transaction Cost – Myopic Case
Table 6: Payoff matrix: ax → 0 and ay → 0
M2
Sy D
M1
Sx
1
2
+ δ 1
2
, 1
2
+ δ 1
2
1
4
+ δ 1
2
, 3
4
+ δ 1
2
D 3
4
+ δ 1
2
, 1
4
+ δ 1
2
1
2
+ δ 1
2
, 1
2
+ δ 1
2
(D,D;D,D).
ii) Similar to the proof of proposition 1, if ax → 12 and ay → 12 , then the pay-
off matrix in lemma 1 will converge to table 7. Clearly, (Sx, Sy;Sx, Sy) is a Nash
equilibrium.
In this case, we may have multiple equilibria. (D,D;D,D) may still be a Nash
equilibrium, even though it is Pareto dominated by (Sx, Sy;Sx, Sy).
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Table 7: Payoff matrix: ax → 12 and ay → 12
M2
Sy D
M1
Sx
1
4
+ δ 1
2
, 1
4
+ δ 1
2
0 + δ 1
4
, 0 + δ 1
2
D 0 + δ 1
2
, 0 + δ 1
4
0 + δ 1
2
, 0 + δ 1
2
iii) For instance, if δ = 0.1, ax = 0.49 and ay = 0.25, we can check that
(D,Sy;D,D) is a Nash equilibrium.
If δ = 0.3, ax = 0.45 and ay = 0.35, we can check that (Sx, Sy;D,D) is a Nash
equilibrium.
iv) Since δ 1−ax
2
< δ 1−ay
2
< δ 1
2
and the absolute value of differences between δ 1−ax
2
,
δ 1−ay
2
, and δ 1
2
are increasing in δ, comparing table 1 and table 3, clearly D is more
likely to be the choice for both M1 and M2 at date 1.0 if δ increases. Therefore, M1
and M2 are more likely to end up with (D,D;D,D) if they are more patient.
v) According to the proof in part ii) above, if ay ≥ 2
√
3 − 3, (Sx, Sy;Sx, Sy) is a
Nash equilibrium. Similarly, according to 7, (D,D;D,D) is also a Nash equilibrium.
In this case, we have a coordination game.
vi) If ay ≥ 2
√
3− 3, according to the bottom half of table 2, to let (Sx, D) be an
equilibrium choice at date 1.0, we must have{
UXD − 12UA + δ 1−ay2 ≥ UA + δ 12
UXD +
1
2
UA + δ
1
2
≥ UXY + δ 12
This implies {
UXD − 12UA ≥ UA + δ ay2 > UA
UXD +
1
2
UA ≥ UXY
Back to the proof in proposition 1, clearly this is impossible for 0 < ay < ax <
1
2
.
If ay < 2
√
3−3, according to the top half of table 2, to let (Sx, D) be an equilibrium
choice at date 1.0, we must have{
UXD − 12UA + δ 1−ay2 ≥ UA + δ 12
UXD +
1
2
UA + δ
1
2
≥ UXY + δ 1−ax2
Using the exhaustion method, by Matlab simulation (see figure 8), the above two
inequalities will not hold at the same time for 0 < ay < ax <
1
2
and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
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Figure 8: Areas of Inequalities Hold
Proof of Corollary 6
i) If ay ≥ 2
√
3 − 3, according to the payoff matrix in table 3, the first best is
2UXY + δ. Thus, the transaction cost under different combination of choices at date
1.0 are as described in table 8.
Table 8: Transcation Cost – Foresighted Case: ay ≥ 2
√
3− 3
M2
Sy D
M1
Sx 0 2(UXY − UXD) + δ ay2
D 2(UXY − UDY ) + δ ax2 2(UXY − UA)
According to proposition 3, if ay ≥ 2
√
3 − 3 the symmetric strategic alliance is
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sustainable. Thus, transaction cost is zero.
ii) If ay < 2
√
3 − 3, according to the payoff matrix in table 3, the first best is
2UXY + δ. Thus, the transaction cost under different combination of choices at date
1.0 are as described in table 9.
Table 9: Transcation Cost – Foresighted Case: ay < 2
√
3− 3
M2
Sy D
M1
Sx δ(
ax
2
+ ay
2
) 2(UXY − UXD) + δ ay2
D 2(UXY − UDY ) + δ ax2 2(UXY − UA)
Similar to the proof of corollary 1, given δ, transaction cost is not monotonic with
respect to ax and ay. In particular, if fixed learning costs are small, the equilibrium
choice at date 1.0 will be (D,D) and M1 and M2 end up with autarchy. In this case,
transaction cost is 2UXY − 2UA, which is increasing in fixed learning costs. If fixed
learning costs are increasing to some extent, the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 may be
(D,Sy) and M1 and M2 may end up with forming asymmetric strategic alliance. In
this case, transaction cost is 2UXY −2UDY + δ ax2 , which is increasing in fixed learning
costs. Using the exhaustion method, by Matlab simulation, there exists a jump down
of transaction cost during the transition from (D,D) to (D,Sy). If fixed learning costs
are large enough but still ay < 2
√
3 − 3, the equilibrium choice at date 1.0 will be
(Sx, Sy) and M1 and M2 end up with forming symmetric strategic alliance (unstable
– disbanded to autarchy at stage 2). In this case, transaction cost is δ(ax
2
+ ay
2
),
which is increasing in fixed learning costs. Using the exhaustion method, by Matlab
simulation, there exists a jump down of transaction cost during the transition from
(D,D) or (D,Sy) to (Sx, Sy).
Further, given ax and ay, transaction cost is non-decreasing with respect to δ.
From the proof of proposition 3, as δ increases, the possible transition of equilibrium
choice at date 1.0 is from (Sx, Sy) to (D,Sy) then to (D,D). Using the exhaustion
method, by Matlab simulation, transaction cost is non-decreasing with respect to δ
during these transitions.
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